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IN THE SU:"'REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROSE 0. SWEDIN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
THORSTEN FRED St~DIN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16003 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEI1ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought an order to show cause against 
defendant seeking, among other claims, to recover for alleged 
arrearages on the mortgage obligation on real property awarded 
to plaintiff pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff for 
the alleged arrearages in an undetermined amount. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment and 
order entered against defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 25, 1978 plaintiff served defendant 
with an order to show cause and petition for modification, 
including therein a claim against defendant for alleged 
arrearages as to the mortgage obligation on real property 
awarded to plaintiff in a Decree of Divorce entered on 
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April 21, 1976. 
Said claim for arrearages had already been dis-
missed with prejudice and on the merits pursuant to an 
order signed on February 25, 1978 by the Honorable David K. 
Winder. (R. 33-39) 
On March 3, 1978 defendant's attorney filed a 
motion to refer the above matter to the Honorable David K. 
Winder, claiming that the points asserted by plaintiff 
were the same as those already heard and decided by said 
Judge. Further, defendant claimed that plaintiff's petition 
constituted an attempt at a rehearing of the same issues. 
(R. 55-56) 
At the hearins on plaintiff's order to show cause 
held on March 9, 1978, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor denied 
defendant's motion for referral. The court granted judgment 
for plaintiff against the defendant on said alleged arrear-
ages, leaving the amount of said judgment open for proof at 
a later time. An amended judgment and order reflecting 
such was signed on July 25, 1978. (R. 91-93) 
On August 10, 1978 defendant filed a Notice of 
Appeal from said amended judgment and order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LO>'i'ER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR REFERRAL AND IN GRAl\ITING JUDG-
~ffiNT FOR PLAINTIFF ON THE CLAI~D ARREARAGES 
Section 78-7-19, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
prohibits repeated applications for the same order. Said 
-2-
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statute reads as follows: 
If an application for an order, 
made to a judge of a court in 
which the action or proceedincr 
is pending, is refused in whole 
or in part, or is granted con-
ditionally, no subsequent applica-
tion for the same order can be 
made to any other judge, except 
of a higher court; but nothing 
in this section applies to motions 
refused for any informality in the 
papers or proceeding necessary to 
obtain the order, or to motions 
refused with liberty to renew the 
same. 
As an indication of the seriousness of the prohibi-
tion against repeated applications, the legislature provided 
that violations of the above statute may be punished as a 
contempt. §78-7-20, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
The policy underlying these statutory provisions 
is sound. In the interest of preserving judicial order and 
promoting certainty, multiple applications for the same 
relief should be limited to circumstances involving mere 
procedural defects or where leave is granted to renew a 
motion. 
In the instant case, the claim brought by plaintiff 
concerning alleged arrearages on mortgage obligations on 
property awarded to plaintiff was identical to the claim 
already dismissed with prejudice by the Honorable David K. 
Winder in a prior hearing. Following is a portion of the 
transcript of that hearing held on February 11, 1977: 
MR. ALLRED: Before \ve cret into 
that, May I at least inquire. 
-3-
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I think there are three things 
in the Petition. One is a 
modification of the Decree to 
require payment on an obligation 
on which the plaintiff now owes, 
and I don't think I heard Mr.--
MR. THURBER: \•Je are going to 
limit this. 
THE COURT: You are going to waive 
that particular claim? 
MR. THURBER: For the present. 
THE COURT: That is, as I under-
stand, his mother is owed an 
obligation out of a property that 
was awarded to her and you are dropping 
that claim. Is that correct? 
l'!R. THURBER: Yes. v·Je are not going 
to argue that at this time. 
MR. ALLRED: May we include that in 
the order that the Court will deny 
that aspect of relief? 
THE COURT: If you are not pursuing it, 
the order will be that this is dismissed 
with prejudice. (Reporter's partial--
transcript, p. 2, emphasis added) 
The order signed by the court on February 25, 1977 
included a provision dismissing plaintiff's claim with 
prejudice and on the merits. (R. p. 39, paragraph 4). 
Counsel for plaintiff did not object to said provision nor 
was the order appealed from. 
Despite this prior ruling on the same issue by a 
different judge, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor denied defendant's 
motion for referral and, further, granted judgment on said 
claim for plaintiff against defendant. Appellant contends 
that clearly the court erred in so doing. 
-4-
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The case of In Re: Estate of Mecham, 537 P.2d 312, 
(1975), concerned the question of one judge vacating the 
order of a different judge of the same court. In Mecham, 
the administrator of the estate filed an accounting and 
petition for distribution and discharge. At a hearing on 
the matter, the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson denied the 
petition with leave to amend. Subsequently, the administrator 
filed a supplemental accounting and his attorney obtained 
an ex parte order approving the accounting and granting final 
distribution and discharge. Five days later, the heirs filed 
objections to the accounting and requested that the matter be 
set for trial. 
Subsequently, the administrator's attorney filed 
a motion to strike the objections and noticed it for hearing. 
Counsel for the objectors failed to appear at said hearing, 
claiming he was not aware of the hearing because the notice 
pertaining thereto had been buried near the end of the motion 
to strike, a document amounting to some thirty-nine pages. 
Therefore, counsel for the objectors filed a motion 
to vacate the judgment in favor of the administrator and, 
upon inquiring of Judge Jeppson, the matter was ordered placed 
on the law and motion calendar, where it could be properly 
heard by any other judge of the same court. 
At the hearing on the motion to vacate Judge 
Jeppson's order, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor vacated Judge 
Jeppson's order striking the objectors' exceptions and 
ordered that a hearing on the merits should be held concerning 
-5-
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the objections to the petition for distribution and 
discharge. No motion was made by counsel for the adminis-
trator to rescind or modify said order, nor was it appealed 
from. 
At the hearing on the objections to the accounting, 
the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. held that Judge Taylor's 
vacating of Judge Jeppson's previous order approving the 
accounting '\Y"as in error, and on his own motion dismissed the 
objections. 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in vacating and remanding, 
held that Judge Taylor's order was proper in that Judge 
Jeppson had directed that the matter be placed on the general 
law and motion calendar. However, as to Judge Hanson's order, 
the Court held that he had improperly overruled Judge Taylor's 
order. The Court stated: 
~~ile in normal procedure and protocol 
this motion would have come up before 
Judge Jeppson, when he directed that 
it be placed on the general law and 
motion calendar, anyjudge of the court 
had jurisdiction to act in the matter. 
Hhen Judge Taylor did so, and his 
order was not changed or appealed 
from, it became the effective order 
in the case. However, what happened 
with respect to Judge Hanson's order, 
entered 19 months later, was entirely 
different. It was attacked by a 
proper and timely motion for a new 
trial; and that failing, by this 
appeal. 
Accepting and applying the rule 
stated above, that one district 
judge of concurrent jurisdiction 
cannot act as an appellate judge 
and reverse the rulina of another, 
precludes Judge Hanson himself from 
-6-
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vacating the order of Judge Taylor. 
537 P.2d at 314. 
The case at bar involves precisely the same 
type of situation. No attempt was made to modify or vacate 
Judge Winder's prior order, nor did plaintiff attempt to 
appeal therefrom. Consequently, that order became final 
as to the same claim raised by plaintiff in the later hearing 
before Judge Taylor. Under the rationale of Mecham, Judge 
Taylor erred in first denying defendant's motion for referral 
and then, in vacating Judge Winder's order and granting judg-
ment for plaintiff on the claimed arrearages. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT 
ON A CLAIH T'lliiCH HAD NOT YET ~1ATURED 
If Judge Taylor's actions in granting judgment for 
plaintiff were held not to be error despite Judge vlinder' s 
prior ruling, appellant contends that the lmver court inproperly 
granted judgment on the claimed arrearages. The evidence pre-
sented against defendant consisted solely of plaintiff's 
affidavit and testimony concerning alleged claims against 
her by the mortgage obligee. No corroborating evidence or 
testimony was introduced. Further, no action against 
plaintiff for such alleged arrearages had yet been brought 
by the mortgage obligee. 
Consequently, judgment was granted on the basis 
of unsupported hearsay evidence. This fact was reflected 
in the amended judgment and order in that a determination 
as to the amount of the alleged damages was left open 
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for further hearing if and when an action for said arrearages 
was filed against the plaintiff. 
Appellant contends that judgment was granted 
prematurely on a claim not proven to be in existence at the 
time the judgment was rendered. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, on the basis of the foregoing, respect-
fully requests this court to reverse the judgment of the 
lower court and remand the matter for the purpose of vacating 
the judgnent and order against the defendant on the basis 
that the claims involved therein were already decided in 
appellant's favor by a diff~t judge. 
DATED this~day of December, 1978. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of 
Appellant's Brief, postage prepaid, to E. H. Fankhauser, 
Cotro-Manes, Warr, Fankhauser & Green, Attorney for 
Respondent, 430 Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/ 
(j lj_ 
this 7 day of December, 1978. 
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